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I. Introduction
In a case of first impression, the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Appellate Division, offered an original interpretation
of the requisite mens rea to convict under criminal provisions
of the Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act of 1987 (FWPA)2
in State v. Robertson.3 In reversing the defendant's convic-
tion, the Robertson court held that it was essential for the
State to prove that "the defendant knew or should have
known that he was filling wetlands subject to the Act."4 Con-
sequently, the court imposed a heavy burden on the prosecu-
tion to convict the defendant who was allegedly in violation of
the criminal provisions of the FWPA. Robertson adds to the
list of cases that have attempted to establish some measure
to distinguish between those elements of environmental
crimes that prescribe culpability and those that do not. Much
like those decisions that came before it, Robertson "left for
another day the establishment of criteria" that would allow
this distinction.5 The decision in Robertson, which required
that a violator of the FWPA have knowledge of the illegality
of his or her acts, appeared to run contrary to a majority of
cases that have interpreted the mens rea requirement in
2. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9B-9a, 17a, 21f (West 1994).
3. 3670 A.2d 1096 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
4. Id. at 1099.
5. Mary S. Henifin, State Must Prove Intent in Wetlands Crimes, 144
N.J.L.J. 1016, 1017 (1996).
3
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criminal provisions of environmental statutes. This Case
Note will explain how Robertson was improperly decided.
The jury should have been instructed that in order to obtain a
criminal conviction under the FWPA, the State need only
prove that the defendant knew factually what he was doing,
rather than that what he was doing was prohibited by a
statute.
Part II of this Case Note examines the culpability re-
quirements of particular federal criminal and environmental
statutes, and State v. Sewell, 6 a Supreme Court of New
Jersey case relied on by the Robertson court. It also discusses
the imposition of the public welfare doctrine on criminal pro-
visions of the FWPA as a device to regulate certain types of
dangerous and harmful activities and considers the justifica-
tions for imposing strict liability for violations of certain crim-
inal statutes. Moreover, Part II outlines freshwater wetlands
protection in New Jersey prior to the FWPA, the purposes for
enacting the FWPA, and the specific criminal provisions of
the FWPA that were interpreted in Robertson. Part III exam-
ines the facts, holding, and reasoning of the Robertson deci-
sion, including the arguments raised by both parties. Part IV
analyzes the court's decision in Robertson by examining the
express words of the FWPA's criminal provisions and its leg-
islative history. Part IV also looks at the decisions of other
courts that have interpreted the mens rea requirements of
criminal statutes and determines whether the decision in
Robertson is consistent with them. Furthermore, Part IV
considers whether a violation of the criminal provisions of the
FWPA could have appropriately been considered a public wel-
fare offense. Lastly, Part IV discusses whether the decision
in Robertson follows the current trend of assigning culpability
requirements to criminal environmental statutes, and
whether, when considered with other decisions, helps to es-
tablish a concrete test for determining when to apply culpa-
bility to elements of environmental crimes. Finally, Part V
concludes that analyzing the criminal provisions of the
FWPA as a public welfare statute would have been proper,
6. 603 A.2d 21 (N.J. 1992).
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and that knowledge of the existence of wetlands and the stat-
utes that regulate them was inappropriately deemed a neces-
sary element in a FWPA criminal prosecution.
II. Background
A. Origins of Mens Rea
1. Common Law Origins
It has long been recognized that acts punishable as
crimes require proof of mens rea.7 In fact, this concept is so
deeply rooted in Anglo-American jurisprudence that courts
have found mens rea to apply even in instances where Con-
gress has not explicitly written it into the criminal statute.8
As the states codified the common law of crimes, courts recog-
nized that since intent was so inherent in the idea of the of-
fense, an omission did not signify its disapproval. 9 In an
often cited passage in Morissette v. United States,10 the Court
observed that "[u]nqualified acceptance of this doctrine by
English common law in the Eighteenth Century was indi-
cated by Blackstone's sweeping statement that to constitute
any crime there must first be a 'vicious will.'"1 However, an
exception to this principle developed in England and the
United States for "public welfare offenses," characterized as
"offenses punishable without regard to any mental ele-
ment."1 2 In a prosecution for selling intoxicating liquor, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Boyn-
ton,1 3 held that "if the defendant purposely sold the liquor,
7. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
2147, 2176 (William C. Jones ed. 1976).
8. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (stating that the
omission of any intent from the statute will not be interpreted as eliminating
that element).
9. See id.
10. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
11. Id. at 251.
12. Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56
(1933). Professor Sayre was the originator of the phrase "public welfare
offenses."
13. 84 Mass. 160 (2 Allen 1861) (referring to Commonwealth v. Goodman,
97 Mass. 117 (1867)).
5
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which was in fact intoxicating, he was bound at his peril to
ascertain the nature of the article which he sold."14
2. "At Peril" Doctrine
At the turn of the century, courts began to recognize the
"at peril" doctrine as applying to particular acts regulated by
statute for the welfare of the public.15 As a result, courts im-
posed an affirmative duty on the part of the actor to learn the
facts, as "every man is presumed to know the law." 16 The
Supreme Court in Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota17 rec-
ognized the "at peril" doctrine as a legitimate extension of the
police power, noting that "the legislation was in effect an ex-
ercise of the police power .... Public policy may require that
in the prohibition or punishment of particular acts it may be
provided that he who shall do them shall do them at his peril,
and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or igno-
rance. "18 Consequently, an actor would be "at peril" with no
possibility of pleading good faith or ignorance.
In United States v. Balint,19 the Court determined that
common law scienter 20 need not be read into an indictment
under the Narcotic Act of 1914.21 The Court in Balint was
concerned with avoiding interference with Congress' purpose
in a public welfare statute by requiring proof of knowledge. 22
Chief Justice Taft, realizing the inherent problems of proving
scienter for such a public welfare regulation and the possibil-
ity of penalizing innocent conduct, subsequently substituted
14. Id. at 160.
15. See M. Diane Barber, Fair Warning: The Deterioration of Scienter
Under Environmental Criminal Statutes, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 105, 111 (1992).
16. Id.
17. 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
18. Id. at 70.
19. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
20. "Scienter" can be defined as "[k]nowingly" and describes "the defend-
ant's... previous knowledge of a state of facts which it was his duty to guard
against, and his omission to do which has led to the injury complained of."
BLAcK's LAw DIcTIoNARY 1345 (6th ed. 1990). "Scienter" has also been defined
as "knowing or intentional misconduct." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 197 (1976).
21. See Balint 258 U.S. at 251-52.
22. See id. at 252.
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the traditional intent requirement with the "at peril" doc-
trine, thus forcing the actor "to find out the facts"23 or be pe-
nalized.24 This approach was consistent with the widely
accepted principle that the primary role of statutes is to pro-
tect the public, not to punish the individual. 25
On the same day that it decided Balint, the Supreme
Court decided United States v. Behrman.26 In Behrman, the
Court held that an indictment under a drug law does not
have to charge intent or knowledge if the statute does not
contain an intent or knowledge requirement.27 The Court re-
affirmed its desire to place the interests of the innocent public
over those of an ignorant actor.28
3. Public Welfare Doctrine
a. Strict Liability Generally
For years, strict liability has been incorporated into envi-
ronmental statutes and other criminal statutes for numerous
reasons. "The premise of strict liability is that the defendant
is held guilty no matter how careful and morally innocent he
or she ... has been. '29 The implementation of strict liability
has been justified for certain "morality crimes" and offenses
involving "transgressions of society's sexual and social
norms."30 One justification for imposing strict liability for
these types of offenses is society's discomfort with particular
kinds of behavior.31 As a result, the legislature is more likely
to turn to strict liability to shift the risk of potential physical
23. Id. at 254.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
27. See id. at 288.
28. See id.
29. Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: III-The Rise and Fall
of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337, 356 (1989).
30. Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability
Crimes, 78 CORNELL L. REV.- 401, 422-23 (1993). Strict liability is justified
under the theory that "the need to prevent certain kinds of occurrences is suffi-
ciently great as to override the undesirable effect of punishing those who might
in some either sense be 'innocent.'" Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in
the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731, 739 (1960).
31. See Levenson, supra note 30, at 424.
7
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or moral harm to the defendant.3 2 Furthermore, the imposi-
tion of strict liability is likely to increase the probability that
a culpable defendant will avoid punishment by claiming igno-
rance or mistake. 33 Another theory supporting the imposi-
tion of strict liability for morality offenses is that the
defendant is engaged in high-risk activity, and therefore is
deserving of punishment, whether or not he intended the
result.34
There is also opposition to the doctrine of strict liability.
Some critics suggest that strict liability is inconsistent with
the utilitarian and retributivist theories of punishment.3 5
According to the utilitarian theory, punishment is justified if
it deters unlawful conduct. 36 Under certain circumstances,
individuals may abstain from engaging in constitutionally
protected activities because of their fear of being punished for
doing so.37 Moreover, an individual who has no reason to be-
lieve that he is engaging in unlawful behavior will not be de-
terred, since if he is unaware that he is doing anything
illegal, he will be unable to change his conduct until after the
act has been completed.38
According to the retributivist approach, a person should
be punished for choosing to break the law.39 Retributionists
suggest that the law should hold individuals responsible only
32. See id. at 423-24.
33. "Any increase in the number of conditions required to establish criminal
liability increases the opportunity for deceiving the courts or juries by the pre-
tence that some condition is not satisfied." Steven S. Nemerson, Note, Criminal
Liability Without Fault: A Philosophical Perspective, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1517
(1975) (quoting H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 77 (1968)).
34. See Levenson, supra note 30, at 420-22. This is a significant theory sup-
porting the imposition of strict liability for "public welfare offenses."
35. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAw 247-48
(1986).
36. See generally Louis M. Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals:
Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L. J. 315 (1984).
37. See Phillip E. Johnson, Strict Liability: The Prevalent View, in 4 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1512, 1520-21 (1983).
38. See Levenson, supra note 30, at 427 (citing Reynolds v. G.H. Austin &
Sons Ltd., 2 K.B. 135, 150 (Eng. 1951) (concluding that it is senseless to impose
a penalty on an individual who could not have reasonably been aware of the
relevant circumstances surrounding his actions)).
39. See Nemerson, supra note 33, at 1560-65.
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for those acts for which they are blameworthy because of a
knowing and conscious breach of the law, not because of acci-
dental conduct.40 "At a minimum, the defendant must have
acted below the standard of care that a reasonable person
would have exercised under the same conditions."41
b. Strict Liability for Public Welfare Offenses
Courts have consistently applied strict liability to public
welfare offenses-those for which the defendant's knowledge
is presumed because of the danger of the activity involved.42
The public welfare doctrine establishes an exception -to the
rule that to constitute a crime, a vicious mind must accom-
pany the action. 43 "These cases do not fit neatly into any of
such accepted classifications of common-law offenses, such as
those against the state, the person, property, or public
morals."44 Traditional examples include the violation of mo-
tor vehicle laws, the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor, the im-
proper handling of dangerous chemicals or nuclear waste, the
sale of impure or adulterated foods or drugs, criminal nui-
sances, violations of anti-narcotic acts, and violations of vari-
ous Workmen's Compensation Act provisions.45
There are several reasons why the strict liability doctrine
is used to correct public welfare invasions. First, the doctrine
shifts the risk of the dangerous activity to those who are most
able to prevent misfortune. 46 Second, the doctrine makes cer-
tain that juries will consider similar cases that involve the
public welfare alike.47 In other words, it ensures "uniform
40. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 2189-93.
41. Levenson, supra note 30, at 426.
42. See Sayre, supra note 12, at 68. Courts acknowledged that "intent was
so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation."
Morrisette, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
43. See generally Morissette, 342 U.S. 246.
44. Id. at 255.
45. See United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir.
1984) (dumping of hazardous wastes); United States v. International Minerals
& Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971) (transporting of dangerous liquids or prod-
ucts); United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1976) (prosecuting
under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act).
46. See Levenson, supra note 30, at 419.
47. See id. at 421.
9
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treatment of particular high risk conduct."48 Third, strict lia-
bility is often imposed because it can relieve the burden on
the prosecutor to prove intent in complex cases.49 Fourth,
legislatures have determined that the risk of an incorrect pre-
sumption "is outweighed by the need for additional protection
of society and expeditious prosecution of certain cases."50
Lastly, the implementation of strict liability is a strong public
statement that the legislature will not tolerate certain con-
duct, regardless of the actor's intent.51
c. Characteristics of Public Welfare Offenses
(i). Protection of Public Health and Safety
One element of a public welfare statute is the protection
of the public's well being. In United States v. Dotterweich,52
the Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, which sub-
jected the defendant to criminal penalties even though he
was not aware that he was committing any wrongdoing.5 3
More recently, in United States v. Park,5 4 the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its decision in Dotterweich by holding that it was
not necessary to prove knowledge or intent in a prosecution
under this statute.55
48. Id. at 421 (citing Mark Kelman, Strict Liability: An Unorthodox View in
4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUST. 1517 (1983)).
49. See State v. Weisberg, 55 N.E.2d 870, 872 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943).
There are many acts that are so destructive of the social order, or
where the ability of the state to establish the element of criminal
intent would be so extremely difficult if not impossible of proof, that
in the interest of justice the legislature had provided that the doing
of the act constitutes a crime, regardless of knowledge or criminal
intent on the part of the defendant. In these cases it is the duty of
the defendant to know what the facts are that are involved or result
from his acts or conduct.
Id.
50. People v. Travers, 124 Cal. Rptr. 728, 730 (1975) (citing People v. Stu-
art, 302 P.2d 5, 8-9 (1956)).
51. Levenson, supra note 30, at 422.
52. 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
53. See id.
54. 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
55. See id. at 670. In Park, the Court concluded that Congress' intent was
"to require every person dealing in drugs to ascertain at his peril whether that
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/10
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In Morissette,5 6 another case involving the public wel-
fare, the Supreme Court held that the absence of any mention
of intent in the statute at issue would not be construed as
eliminating this element from the crime.5 7 The Court con-
cluded that a showing of criminal intent was necessary to
prove the "knowing" element in a federal statute that prohib-
ited embezzlement, theft, or conversion of government prop-
erty.58 After reviewing the background of the "public welfare
doctrine," the Court refused "to expand the doctrine of crimes
without intent to include those charged here."59 In reaching
its decision, the majority distinguished Morissette from two
earlier cases, Balint60 and Behrman.61 The Court in Moris-
sette reasoned that because the statutes involved in Balint
and Behrman did not contain any requirement of criminal in-
tent, it could not accept these cases as authority for eliminat-
ing intent from offenses incorporated from the common law.62
The offenses before the Court in those cases were of such a
type that the Court had no guidance other than the act itself.
In contrast to those offenses in which Congress is silent as to
the mental elements of the statute, this federal statute in-
volved "a concept of crime already so well defined in common
law and statutory interpretation by the states."63
which he sells comes within the inhibition of the statute, and if he sells the
inhibited drug in ignorance of its character, to penalize him." Balint, 258 U.S.
250, 254 (1992).
56. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
57. See id. at 263.
58. See id. at 270-71.
59. Id. at 260.
60. 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
61. 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
62. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250.
63. Id. at 262. Traditional public welfare offenses basically fall into the fol-
lowing subdivisions: (1) illegal sales of intoxicating liquor; (2) sales of impure or
adulterated food or drugs; (3) sales of misbranded articles, (4) violations of an-
tinarcotic laws; (5) criminal nuisances; (6) violations of traffic regulations; (7)
violations of motor-vehicle laws; and (8) violations of general police regulations
which are passed for the safety, health or well-being of the community. See
Sayre supra note 12, at 55, 73, 84.
11
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(ii). Nature of the Action
Another element of public welfare offenses is the nature
of the action being regulated by the statute. In United States
v. Freed,64 a case that dealt with mens rea in the National
Firearms Act,65 the Court unanimously upheld the statute
based upon the nature of the act-the possession of hand gre-
nades.66 The Court noted that this case did not fall into the
same category of cases as Morissette, but was closer to Dot-
terweich.67 Freed involved a provision of the National Fire-
arms Act that required "no specific intent or knowledge that
the hand grenades were unregistered ... [tihe only knowl-
edge required to be proven was knowledge that the instru-
ment possessed was a firearm."68
(iii). Absence of a Mens Rea Requirement
Another common, although not entirely conclusive char-
acteristic of public welfare statutes, is the absence of any
mens rea requirement. The cases that have been character-
ized as involving public welfare offenses have dealt primarily
with statutes containing no culpability requirement, estab-
lishing, in effect, a type of strict criminal liability.69 Balint
involved a provision of the Narcotic Act of 1914 that did not
64. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
65. 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (1994). The National Firearms Act makes it unlaw-
ful for any person "to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to
him." Id.
66. See Freed, 401 U.S. at 601.
67. See id. at 609.
68. Id. at 607. According to the Supreme Court in Morissette,
courts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different of-
fenses, have devised working formulae, if not scientific ones, for the
instruction of juries around such terms as 'felonious intent,' 'crimi-
nal intent,' 'malice afterthought,' 'guilty knowledge,' 'fraudulent in-
tent,' 'willfulness,' 'scienter,' to denote guilty knowledge, or 'mens
rea,' to signify an evil purpose or mental culpability.
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252.
69. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975) (holding that when
the statute under which defendants were prosecuted eliminated "consciousness
of wrongdoing," a failure to act was considered a sufficient basis for liability);
see also Freed, 401 U.S. at 607 (1992) (deciding that no element of mens rea was
necessary to convict under a statute prohibiting the receipt or possession of an
unregistered firearm); Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1945) (concluding that
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol15/iss2/10
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contain a mens rea requirement. 70 The Court held that in
order to prosecute under this Act, the government must es-
tablish that the defendant knew he was selling drugs-it was
not necessary to prove that the defendant knew that the
items he sold were "narcotics," as defined under the act.71
Similarly, in Freed,72 a case involving a provision of the
National Firearms Act, there was no mens rea requirement
specified in the statute.73 Consequently, the Court held that
since this act required no intent or knowledge by the defend-
ants that the hand grenades were unregistered, the dismissal
of an indictment charging them with possessing and conspir-
ing to possess unregistered hand grenades was in error. 74 Ac-
cording to other decisions that were decided before this
requirement was written into the statute, the only knowledge
required was the defendant's knowledge that the device pos-
sessed was a firearm. 75
(iv). Light Fines and Penalties
The imposition of minor fines and penalties, not prison
terms, for offenses in which the "conviction does no grave
damage to an offender's reputation," is characteristic of most
traditional public welfare offenses. 76 The penalty that a par-
ticular statute or regulation imposes is often a starting point
for determining if a statute is a traditional public welfare
statute.7 7 Courts have been hesitant to convict defendants
without proof of mens rea when the penalties are extreme,
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not require knowledge that the
items at issue were misbranded or adulterated).
70. See Balint, 258 U.S. at 251. The section of the act involved provided in
part: "it shall be unlawful for any person to sell, barter, exchange, or give away
any of the aforesaid drugs .... " Id.
71. See id. at 253.
72. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
73. See id. at 607.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Kepten D. Carmichael, Strict Criminal Liability for Environmental Vio-
lations: A Need for Judicial Restraint, 71 IND. L. REV. 740 (1996) (quoting Mor-
issette, 342 U.S. at 256).
77. See id. at 742. See also ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 793-98 (2d
ed. 1969).
13
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because, as some legal scholars have concluded, "[t]he sense
of justice of the community will not tolerate the infliction of
punishment which is substantial upon those innocent of in-
tentional . . . wrongdoing."78 Typical public welfare offenses
that impose minor fines or penalties include many traffic reg-
ulations and motor vehicle violations, and generally, any of-
fense that does not involve a term for years in prison.79
B. Background Principles of Mens Rea
1. General Intent Versus Specific Intent
Mens rea is incorporated into the criminal provisions of
most federal environmental statutes by the term "know-
ing."80 In determining the meaning of "knowing," courts have
typically imposed a general intent requirement, unless speci-
fied to the contrary by the words of the statute. Under this
requirement, the government must prove that the defendant
generally knew what he had done, rather than that his act or
omission violated the law.8 ' Thus, the defendant would be
unable to defend on the ground that he was unaware he was
doing something illegal.8 2 For example, the government is
neither required to prove that the defendant was aware of the
identity of a particular substance he was disposing of, nor
that the defendant knew of the existence of any statutory,
regulatory or permit prohibition which made disposal of the
substance illegal.83 It need only prove that the defendant
was disposing of a material that he knew generally to be
harmful.8 4
78. Sayre, supra note 12, at 55.
79. See Alan Saltzman, Strict Criminal Liability and the United States
Constitution: Substantive Criminal Due Process, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1571, 1573
(1978).
80. See, e.g., RCRA § 3008(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d); Clean Water Act
§ 309(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2); CERCLA § 103(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b).
81. See United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. de-
nied, 115 S. Ct. 939 (1995).
82. See DANIEL RIESEL, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
6-43 (1997).
83. See id.
84. See id.
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At times, Congress has strayed from this general intent
requirement, moving in either of two directions-toward a
standard of no intent, thereby imposing strict criminal liabil-
ity, or toward a standard of specific intent, thereby requiring
proof that the violator had some specific statutory or regula-
tory knowledge that went beyond the factual knowledge of
what he was doing. 5 Liparota v. United States8 6 supports
the principle that where only proof of general intent is re-
quired, the government need only prove that the defendant
knew or was conscious of his actions, and where only proof of
specific intent is required, the government must prove that
the defendant not only intended his acts but was aware that
the consequences of his acts would be illegal.8 7 In Liparota,
the defendant was convicted under a statute that imposed
criminal penalties for "whoever knowingly uses, transfers, ac-
quires, alters, or possesses coupons or authorization cards in
any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the regula-
tions." 8 The jury was given a general intent instruction-
that the government need only prove that the defendant ac-
quired and possessed the food stamps in a manner not au-
thorized by law, rather than one which required proof that
the defendant knew his acts were illegal.8 9 The Supreme
Court reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that a spe-
cific intent instruction should have been given; the govern-
ment was required to prove that the defendant knew what
the law was and had an intent to violate it.90 Thus, the Court
determined that the government must show that the defend-
ant knew his use of the food stamps was in a manner unau-
thorized by the statute. 91 The Court distinguished the type of
offenses involved in Liparota and Morissette from public wel-
fare offenses involving conduct of such a potentially danger-
85. See id.
86. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
87. See id. at 425.
88. Id. at 433.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
15
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ous nature that the actor is presumed to have knowledge of
any applicable regulations. 92
2. Knowledge of the Law and Knowledge of the Facts
"The distinction between knowledge of law and knowl-
edge of fact is simultaneously obvious and subtle."93 "Knowl-
edge of facts refers to the facts that make the defendant's
conduct unlawful," facts which can include "the conduct itself,
or any external circumstances, or consequences of the con-
duct"-neither knowledge of the legal consequences of the de-
fendant's acts nor its legal relevance is considered as such. 94
Knowledge of the law means that the defendant must
know that the criminal prohibition exists and that he is in
violation of it, or
it may mean only that when.., a criminal provision incor-
porates by reference a standard of conduct from another
source of law (either a different statutory provision or im-
plementing regulations), the defendant must know that
there is a standard of conduct and that she is violating it.
Under this second, broader meaning, the defendant need
not know that such a violation is subject to criminal
sanction.95
The issue of the defendant's knowledge of the law in environ-
mental criminal law focuses solely on this second meaning.96
There is no criminal penalty provision that requires the gov-
ernment to prove the defendant's knowledge of the criminal
status of his conduct. 97 "There is, however, textual support
for the view that the defendant must possess some knowledge
of the environmental standards external to the criminal pen-
alty provision that serve as the basis for prosecution." 98
92. See id. at 432-33.
93. Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolu-
tion of Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO.
L.J. 2407, 2471 (1995).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 2468.
97. See id.
98. Id.
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In the area of criminal law, federal courts have generally
adopted the principle that "ignorance of the law is no ex-
cuse."99 Consistent with this principle, in United States v.
Weitzenhoff,100 the Ninth Circuit upheld the convictions of
two sewage treatment plant managers, holding that "congres-
sional explanations of the new penalty provisions strongly
suggest that criminal sanctions are to be imposed on an indi-
vidual who knowingly engages in conduct that results in a
permit violation, regardless of whether the polluter is cogni-
zant of the requirements or even the existence of the
permit."0 1
3. Rule of Lenity
The rule of lenity is a substantive canon of statutory in-
terpretation that requires the court to resolve statutory and
regulatory ambiguities in favor of a criminal defendant. 10 2
Under this theory, if a criminal statute or regulation does not
clearly prohibit specific conduct, the defendant cannot be pe-
nalized. 0 3 The rule of lenity also safeguards the procedural
due process right to adequate notice of the type of conduct
that can potentially give rise to criminal punishment. 0 4
Upon examination of the express words and legislative
history of a statute, and analysis of background assumptions
99. See generally United States v. International Minerals, 402 U.S. 558
(1971).
100. 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1994).
101. Id. at 1284.
102. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985) (stating that
ambiguities concerning the words of a criminal statute are to be resolved in
favor of lenity).
103. See Lisa K. Sachs, Strict Construction of the Rule of Lenity in the Inter-
pretation of Environmental Crimes, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 600 (1996).
104. See Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979) (observing that the
"long established practice of resolving questions concerning the ambit of a crim-
inal statute in favor of lenity . . . is rooted in fundamental principles of due
process which mandate that no individual be forced to speculate, at peril of in-
dictment, whether his conduct is prohibited."); Connally v. General Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (noting that crimes must be clearly defined so individ-
uals have adequate notice that their conduct may be prohibited. The rationale
for this principle of adequate notice was derived from the notion that a legisla-
ture cannot penalize an individual who is unaware of his wrongdoing as a result
of a vague statutory provision).
17
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of criminal law, if the meaning of the statute cannot be deter-
mined, the rule of lenity provides the court with a public pol-
icy rationale to prefer the interpretation most favorable to
the defendant-the need to ensure that the defendant has
been given fair warning that his conduct has been deemed
criminal. 105 Proponents of the rule of lenity find merit in the
rule as being supportive of constitutional principles. How-
ever, critics argue that the rule "is merely an interpretive
shortcut to result-oriented jurisprudence."10 6 Courts have
consistently emphasized the need for fair warning, regardless
of whether the offense charged is mala prohibitum (where the
conduct involved is more morally ambiguous and where no-
tice becomes more significant) or mala in se (an act which is
in and of itself wrong, such as the crime of homicide). 10 7
In United States v. International Minerals & Chemical
Corp.,108 the Court did not state that the rule of lenity was
completely unavailable as a defense in regulatory contexts in-
volving "dangerous or deleterious devices or products or ob-
noxious waste materials." 109 However, its willingness to
"presume regulatory awareness and forego traditional mens
rea protections for such activities suggested that the Court
would be leery of reliance on the rule of lenity to resolve am-
biguity in statutes intended to protect human health and the
environment."'" 0
In Liparota, the Court reaffirmed the pro-regulatory po-
sition that it took in International Minerals."' The Liparota
Court applied the rule of lenity to the statute at issue and
refused to dispense with the mens rea requirement. 112 The
105. See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427.
106. Sachs, supra note 103, at 605.
107. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (stating that the
rule of lenity "serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of the boundaries
of criminal conduct and that legislatures, not courts, define criminal liability").
108. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
109. Id. at 565.
110. David E. Filippi, Unleashing the Rule of Lenity: Environmental Enforc-
ers Beware!, 26 ENVTL. L. 923, 936 (1996) (citing International Minerals, 402
U.S. at 564-65).
111. See Liparota, 471 U.S. 419, 419 (1985).
112. See id. at 427.
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government unsuccessfully argued that the defendant's viola-
tion under the Food Stamp Act constituted a "public welfare"
offense, an argument, which if successful, would have permit-
ted the Court to forego a mens rea requirement. 113 However,
the Court established a test for determining whether an of-
fense fits the "public welfare" category; the crime must be of
"a type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is
subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously
threaten the community's health or safety."11 4 By establish-
ing a test for identifying "public welfare" offenses, the Court
also appeared to be setting forth an exception to the tradi-
tional application of the rule of lenity:11 5
If an act falls within the 'public welfare' category of of-
fenses, then a 'reasonable person should know' that his
conduct is regulated. It follows that if a defendant is pre-
sumed to know that his conduct is regulated, the rule of
lenity is no longer necessary to ensure that the defendant
has received fair warning that his conduct is in fact regu-
lated. Instead, the existence of 'stringent public regula-
tion' and the serious threat to 'the community's health and
safety' removes the basis for the rule of lenity's pro-defend-
ant presumption. 16
In Staples v. United States,117 another case brought
under the National Firearms Act, the Court affirmed its hold-
ing in International Minerals by observing that those who
possess or deal with "deleterious devices or products or ob-
noxious waste material" should be "on notice that they stand
'in responsible relation to a public danger."'' 1 The govern-
ment argued that "dangerousness alone should alert an indi-
vidual to probable regulation and justify treating a statute
that regulates the dangerous device as dispensing with mens
113. See id. at 432 (quoting Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 252-53 (1952)). A pub-
lic welfare crime "depend[s] on no mental element but consist[s] only of forbid-
den acts or omissions." Liparota, 471 U.S. at 432.
114. Id. at 433.
115. See Filippi, supra note 110, at 938.
116. Id. (citing Liparota, 471 U.S. at 432).
117. 511 U.S. 600 (1994).
118. Id. at 611.
19
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rea."119 However, the Court responded that the mere "dan-
gerousness" of an item "does not necessarily suggest ... that
it is not also entirely innocent. Even dangerous items can, in
some cases, be so commonplace and generally available that
we would not consider them to alert individuals to the likeli-
hood of strict regulation ...."120 Thus, the Court in Staples
believed that the "commonality and general availability" of
firearm ownership prevented interpretation of the statute as
creating a public welfare offense which might otherwise have
dispensed with mens rea.12' The Court in Staples did not use
the rule of lenity to reach its conclusion because it did not
find ambiguity in the statute.1 22 However, its finding that
the dangerousness of a regulated activity or device would not
necessarily "alert individuals to the likelihood of strict regu-
lation," enables other courts confronted with ambiguous crim-
inal statutes alleging to regulate these dangerous activities
or devices, to utilize the rule of lenity.1 23 Had the Court de-
termined that dangerousness was sufficient to categorize an
offense as a public welfare offense, the rule of lenity would
not have been available. 24
C. Mens Rea in Federal Water Pollution Control Statutes
1. Clean Water Act 125
a. Knowledge of the Statute Not an Element of
the Offense
In most instances, criminal liability has been imposed
under the Clean Water Act (CWA) without proof that the de-
fendant had knowledge of the applicable laws or regulations.
In United States v. Weitzenhoff,126 the defendant was con-
victed under section 301(a) of the CWA for discharging sew-
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Filippi, supra note 110, at 942 (quoting Staples, 511 U.S. at 614).
122. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 619 n.17.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 619.
125. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (1994) (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act (CWA)).
126. 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993).
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age into navigable waters without a NPDES permit, and
section 309(c)(2) which makes it a felony to "knowingly vio-
late" this permit requirement. 127 As in any case of first im-
pression, the Ninth Circuit was required to "first look to the
language of the controlling statutes, and second to legislative
history."128 Moreover, "as with other criminal statutes that
employ the term 'knowingly,' it is not apparent from the face
of the statute whether knowingly' means a knowing violation
of the law or simply knowing conduct that is violative of the
law."1 29 Thus, the court was forced to turn to the legislative
history of the provision in question in order to determine the
requisite intent. 130
The court determined that "knowingly" did not refer to
knowledge of the violation.13' It held that because the crimi-
nal provisions of the CWA were designed to protect public
health and welfare by improving the quality of water, they
fell under the category of public welfare legislation. 1 32 As a
result, the court in Weitzenhoff relied on judicial interpreta-
tions of comparable public welfare statutes. 33 One such case
was International Minerals, 34 in which the Supreme Court
characterized the type of conduct that is regulated by public
welfare statutes. 135 In International Minerals, the Court
127. Id. at 1282-83. Prior to trial, the district court interpreted "knowingly"
in section 309(c)(2) of the CWA as only requiring that the defendants were
aware that they were discharging the pollutants in question, and not that they
were aware of violating the terms of the statute. See id. at 1283. The appel-
lants argued that the district court improperly interpreted the CWA by in-
structing the jury that "the government is not required to prove that the
defendant knew that his act or omissions were unlawful." Id. (citing 14 Tran-
script of Trial at 117). They further proposed that the jury should have been
given their proposed instruction based on the defense that they mistakenly be-
lieved that their acts were allowed by the permit. See id.
128. Id. (citing Central Montana Elec. Power Corp., Inc. v. Administrator of
Bonneville Power Admin., 840 F.2d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir. 1988)).
129. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1283.
130. See id. at 1284.
131. See id. at 1286.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 1284-86.
134. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
135. See generally id. In International Minerals, the appellee was charged
with unlawfully transporting obnoxious wastes under 18 U.S.C. § 834(a), which
makes it a crime to "knowingly violate [ I any... regulation" authorized by the
21
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held that where "dangerous or deleterious devices or products
or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of
regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in
possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to
be aware of the regulation."1 36 The Court concluded that
knowledge of the regulation was not required for conviction
under a statute stating that anyone who knowingly violated
such a regulation is subject to penalty. 137 In other words, the
defendant's knowledge of the shipment of the dangerous
materials was necessary to convict.
The appellants in International Minerals sought to rely
on the decision in Liparota.138 There, the Supreme Court
held that in order to prosecute under the Food Stamp Act of
1964,139 the "Government must prove that the defendant
knew that his acquisition or possession of food stamps was in
a manner unauthorized by statute or regulations.., the Gov-
ernment may prove by reference to facts and circumstances
surrounding the case that petitioner knew that his conduct
was unauthorized or illegal.' 40 The Court concluded that
the issue in Liparota differed substantially from those "public
welfare offenses" that have been recognized in the past.141 In
a majority of these offenses, "Congress has rendered criminal
a type of conduct that a reasonable person should know is
Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to this section of the Code. Id. The
appellee shipped sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acids in interstate commerce and
"did knowingly fail to show on the shipping papers the required classification of
said property, to wit, Corrosive Liquid, in violation of 49 CFR § 173.437 issued
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 834(a)." Id. at 558.
136. Id. at 565. The Supreme Court noted that the public welfare doctrine
should not be applied to all regulated activities. "Pencils, dental floss, paper
clips may also be regulated. But they may be the type of products which might
raise substantial due process questions if Congress did not require . . . 'mens
rea' as to each ingredient of the offense." Id. at 564-565.
137. See id. at 565.
138. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
139. 78 Stat. 708, as amended in 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1994). The Act pro-
vides that anyone who "knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses
[food stamp] coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by
[the statute] or regulations" is subject to a penalty. 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1)
(1994).
140. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433-34.
141. See id. at 433.
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subject to stringent public regulation and may seriously
threaten the community's health or safety."
1 42
Mens rea in criminal provisions of the Clean Water Act
was further examined in United States v. Hopkins. 43 Hop-
kins dealt with the identical provisions of the CWA inter-
preted in Weitzenhoff. The Second Circuit held that the
government was required to prove the defendant knew the
nature of his acts and performed them intentionally.'" It
need not prove that he knew those acts violated the CWA or
any particular provision of that law or of a regulatory per-
mit.' 45 As explained by the court in Hopkins:
In defining the mental state required for conviction under
a given statute ... the courts must seek the proper 'infer-
ence of the intent of Congress,' and in construing knowl-
edge elements that appear in so-called 'public welfare'
statutes-i.e., statutes that regulate the use of dangerous
or injurious goods or materials-the Supreme Court has
inferred that Congress did not intend to require proof that
the defendant knew his actions were unlawful. 146
The court further stated that the defendant's reliance on
Staples was misplaced. 47 The court of appeals in Staples af-
firmed the defendant's conviction on the ground that it was
not necessary for the government to prove the defendant's
knowledge of the weapon's physical characteristics. 1 48 But
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendant
could not be convicted unless the government proved that he
was aware of the nature of his acts.' 49 The Court did not sug-
gest that the government had the burden of proving that the
defendant knew his acts violated the statute at issue.' 50 The
Court in Staples reiterated the point that it had made in Mor-
142. Id. at 432-33.
143. 53 F.3d 533 (2d Cir. 1995).
144. See id. at 541.
145. See id.
146. Id. (citations omitted).
147. See Hopkins, 53 F.3d at 540.
148. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 604.
149. See id.
150. See id.
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issette, that "[nleither this Court, nor, so far as we are aware,
any other has undertaken to delineate a precise line or set
forth comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between
crimes that require a mental element and crimes that do
not."'15
Additionally, in United States v. Frezzo Bros.,152 the
Third Circuit held that the defendants could not avoid liabil-
ity for willfully or negligently discharging pollutants into
navigable waters without a permit, in violation of the
CWA. 15 3 Referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Chi-
cago, Burlington, & Quincy R. Co. v. United States,154 the
court in Frezzo Bros. noted in its opinion that "[tihe power of
the legislature to declare an offense, and to exclude the ele-
ments of knowledge and due diligence from any inquiry as to
its commission, cannot, we think, be questioned."155 The
court concluded that all of the evidence revealed that the de-
fendants "knew or should have known" that their compost-
producing activities were not exempted from federal anti-pol-
lution laws. 156 The court added that the statute under which
the defendants were convicted did not require the govern-
ment to prove that the defendants intended to violate the
law. 157 Rather, it was only necessary that the government
151. Id. at 619-20 (citing Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952)). The Supreme
Court's most recent pronouncement on the issue in Staples was in United States
v. X-Citement Video, Inc. 513 U.S. 64 (1994). In X-Citement Video, Inc., the
Court held that "knowingly" applied to each element of a child pornography
offense, although it concluded that according to the most grammatical reading
of the statute, it should only apply to the element of having transported,
shipped, received, distributed, or reproduced the material in question. See id.
at 68-69. The Court reaffirmed the long-standing view that "the presumption in
favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements
which criminalize otherwise innocent conduct." Id. at 64.
152. 546 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Pa. 1982), affd 703 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1983).
153. See id. at 720.
154. 220 U.S. 559 (1910).
155. Frezzo Bros., 546 F. Supp. at 720.
156. Id. The court did not accept the defendants' argument that the pollution
resulting from their agricultural activities was exempted from the CWA, be-
cause they could not prove that they were aware of this exemption and never
claimed they relied on the regulation when they decided to pollute the water.
See id.
157. See id.
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prove that the defendants intended to perform the acts for
which they were convicted. 158
Recently, in United States v. Wilson,1 59 the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that in a prosecution under section 309(c)(1)(A) of
the CWA, the government must prove the defendant's "knowl-
edge of the facts meeting each essential element of the sub-
stantive offense and not the fact that defendant knew his
conduct to be illegal."1 60 The defendants were convicted of
felony violations under the CWA for knowingly discharging
fill and excavated material into United States' wetlands with-
out a permit.1 61 The court first examined the express words
of the statute and determined that the order of the words
"knowingly violates" suggested that this clause only required
punishment when a person violates the statute with knowl-
edge that his conduct was illegal.' 62 Looking at the structure
of the CWA, the court noted that the conduct made criminal
with the language of "knowingly violates" incorporates nu-
merous elements from other statutory sections, each of which
may be enforced with other civil and criminal penalties if the
acts prohibited are performed with different scienter.163 The
court stated:
If Congress intended that the 'knowing' mens rea accom-
pany each element of the offense, as we have previously
assumed is the case, the task of inserting the alternative
mens rea requirements for the multiple civil and criminal
enforcement provisions within each substantive prohibi-
tion would require confusingly repetitious drafting. A
shorthand method of accomplishing the same purpose thus
would be to insert 'knowingly' in a single place where the
conduct is made criminal, in this case, § 1319(c)(2)(A).164
158. See id.
159. 1997 WL 785530 (4th Cir. 1997).
160. Id. at *14.
161. See id. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2)(A) (1994) imposes criminal penalties on
"[ainy person who knowingly violates section 1311 . . . of this title" and 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12)(A) (1994) prohibit the discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters without a permit. Id.
162. See Wilson, 1997 WL 785530 at *10.
163. See id. See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1994).
164. See Wilson, 1997 WL 785530 at *10 (citation omitted).
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The court then turned to two background rules of com-
mon law concerning mens rea. First, a criminal offense is
typically required to have mens rea, and second, ignorance of
the law is no defense to its violation. 165 The court concluded
that mens rea does not require that a defendant have aware-
ness of the illegality of his conduct, but that he "know the
facts that make his conduct illegal," 166 unless Congress speci-
fies otherwise. 67 Turning to legislative history, the court ob-
served that Congress, by its 1987 amendment to the statute,
intended to increase the impact of CWA penalties by creating
separate criminal provisions for "deliberate" and "negligent"
conduct. 68 It noted that it would be reasonable to assume
that a change from "willful" to "knowing" evidenced Congress'
intent to "effect a change in meaning."169 The court then con-
cluded that Congress intended that the defendant have
knowledge of each of the elements of the prohibited conduct
even if he knew of their legal significance. 70 "This interpre-
tation would not carry with it the corollary that the defend-
ant's ignorance of his conduct's illegality provides him a
defense, but would afford a defense for a mistake of fact.' 7 '
As a result, the court held that the government must prove
the defendant's "knowledge of facts meeting each essential el-
165. See id.
166. Staples, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994). This knowledge generally must be
proven with respect to each of the elements of the offense. See, e.g., United
States v. X-citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994).
167. See Wilson, 1997 WL 785530 at *10.
168. See id. at *11. Prior to its 1987 amendment, the Clean Water Act im-
posed one set of criminal penalties for "willful or negligent" violations. See 33
U.S.C. § 1319(d)(1) (1986). Under the 1987 amendments, negligent violations
were designated as misdemeanors and knowing violations felonies. See 33
U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1)(A), (2)(A) (1994) (the respective "negligent" violation and
"knowing" violation provisions).
169. Wilson, 1997 WL 785530 at *11 (citing Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 539 (2d
Cir. 1995). "Because 'willful' generally connotes a conscious performance of bad
acts with an appreciation of their illegality, we can conclude that Congress in-
tended to provide a different and lesser standard when it used the word 'know-
ingly.'" Id. (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994)).
170. See id.
171. Id.
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ement of the substantive offense, but need not prove that the
defendant knew his conduct to be illegal. '172
The court then addressed the defendant's contention that
a public welfare designation, like in International Minerals
and cases in three other circuits 173 that have determined that
the CWA concerns public welfare offenses, was inappropriate
in the case at hand.174 It stated:
[tihe fact that International Minerals involved regulations
of an inherently deleterious substance of a type not in-
volved in the present prosecution does not undercut our be-
lief that Congress did not here intend to create a mistake-
of-law defense. Even though the materials involved in this
case, fill and native soil from a wetland, may not be inher-
ently deleterious, the Clean Water Act is, as a general mat-
ter, largely concerned with pollutants that are inherently
deleterious.' 7 5
b. Knowledge of the Statute as an Element of the
Offense
In United States v. Ahmad,176 the Fifth Circuit held that
knowledge, which was an element of criminal provisions of
172. Id. at *11 n.4 (citations omitted). Specifically, the court held that the
government must prove the following:
that the defendant knew that he was discharging a substance, elim-
inating a prosecution for accidental discharges; (2) that the defend-
ant correctly identified the substance he was discharging, not
mistaking it for a different, unprohibited substance; (3) that the de-
fendant knew the method or instrumentality used to discharge the
pollutants; (4) that the defendant knew the physical characteristics
of the property into which the pollutant was discharged that iden-
tify it as a wetland, such as the presence of water and water-loving
vegetation; (5) that the defendant was aware of the facts establish-
ing the required link between the wetland and waters of the United
States; and (6) that the defendant knew he did not have a permit.
Id. at *14.
173. The courts in each of these cases noted that the pollutants involved
were inherently dangerous. See Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 534; United States v.
Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 716 (8th Cir. 1997); Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1284.
174. See Wilson, 1997 WL 785530 at *13.
175. Id.
176. 101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1996).
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the CWA under which the defendant was convicted, applied
to each element of the offenses.177 Thus, the government was
required to prove that the defendant not only knew of the na-
ture of his acts, but knew that what he was discharging was a
pollutant.178 The court in Ahmad concluded that CWA viola-
tions do not appear to implicate the public welfare doc-
trine. 179 It explained: "[a]s recent cases have emphasized...
the public welfare offense exception is narrow .... Staples
held, the key to the public welfare offense analysis is whether
'dispensing with mens rea would require the defendant to
have knowledge only of traditional lawful conduct."' s0 The
court further noted that the CWA offenses for which the de-
fendant was convicted possess this characteristic, "for if
knowledge is not required as to the nature of the substance
discharged, one who honestly and reasonably believes he is
discharging water may find himself guilty of a felony if the
substance turns out to be something else."' 8" Moreover, the
fact that violations of section 309(c)(2)(A) of the CWA are felo-
nies punishable by imprisonment, supports the court's view
that they do not fall under the public welfare doctrine. 8 2 As
stated by the court in Ahmad, "public welfare offenses have
virtually always been crimes punishable by relatively light
penalties such as fines or short jail sentences, rather than
substantial terms of imprisonment."'1 3 Thus, serious felonies
should not be included under the public welfare doctrine,
"[a]bsent a clear statement from Congress that mens rea is
not required." 8 4
177. See id. at 390. The defendant was indicted for three violations of the
CWA: (1) knowingly discharging a pollutant from a point source into navigable
water, in violation of 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) and 1319(c)(2)(A); (2) knowingly oper-
ating a source in violation of a pretreatment standard, in violation of 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1317(d) and 1319(c)(2)(A); and (3) knowingly placing another person in immi-
nent danger of death or serious bodily injury by discharging a pollutant, in vio-
lation of 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3). Id. at 388.
178. See id. at 390.
179. See id. at 391.
180. Id. (citations omitted).
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. Id. (citing Staples, 511 U.S. 600, 616 (1994)).
184. Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 391 (citing Staples, 511 U.S. at 618).
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2. Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act' s 5
The Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act
(Ocean Dumping Act) imposes criminal liability for the
dumping of obnoxious waste materials into the ocean if the
defendant "knowingly violate [d]" the act.18 6 In United States
v. Reilly, s7 the United States District Court for the District
of Delaware held that it is only necessary that "the offense be
done consciously; it is not necessary to demonstrate that the
defendant had knowledge of relevant provisions of the
Act."18 8 Upon examining the mens rea element in the context
of the statute and after reviewing the legislative history of
the Act, the court concluded that this interpretation was con-
sistent with the construction of other public welfare environ-
mental statutes.'8 9
D. The Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act of 1987
(FWPA): A Historical Perspective and
Statutory Analysis
1. New Jersey's Definition and Characterization of
Wetlands
According to title 7, section 7A-1.4 of the New Jersey Ad-
ministrative Code, a "freshwater wetland" is
an area that is inundated or saturated by surface water or
groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficient to sup-
port, and that under normal circumstances does support, a
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in satu-
rated soil conditions . . . provided, however, that the De-
partment, in designating a wetland, shall use the three-
parameter approach. 190
185. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401 to -1445 (1994).
186. Id. § 1415(b).
187. 827 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Del. 1993).
188. Id. at 1078.
189. See id.
190. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7A-1.4 (1996). See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9B-3
(West 1991). The three-parameter approach is described in tit. 7, § 7A-2.4(a),
(b) of the New Jersey Administrative Code. It reads:
(a) The designation of freshwater wetlands shall be based upon the
three-parameter approach (that is hydrology, soils and vegeta-
29
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Section 13:9B-3 of the FWPA defines a "transition area" as
"an area on land adjacent to a freshwater wetland which min-
imizes adverse impacts on the wetland or serves as an inte-
gral component of the wetlands ecosystem."' 9 1
The FWPA requires that the Department of Environ-
mental Protection (DEP)192 develop up-to-date wetlands in-
ventory maps to be distributed to the county clerks (or
registrar of deeds and mortgages) and to each municipal
clerk.' 93 Additionally, the FWPA requires that the DEP pro-
vide copies of the National Wetlands Inventory maps pre-
pared by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. 194
Because of the relatively large scale used to prepare the in-
ventory maps, neither set is conclusive for determining the
presence or absence of wetlands. 95
Wetlands are considered to have exceptional natural re-
source value.' 96 They are areas of tremendous natural pro-
ductivity, environmental diversity, and they serve as habitats
tion) enumerated in the "Federal Manual for Identifying and
Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands," and any subsequent
amendments thereto.
(b) The three-parameter approach is a methodology for determin-
ing, in a consistent and repeatable manner, the presence of wet-
lands and the boundaries of wetlands. It requires careful
consideration of such factors as vegetative species composition,
saturated soil conditions, depth to seasonal high water table
and the presence or absence of hydrologic indicators.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7A-2.4(a), (b). Moreover, New Jersey classifies wet-
lands into (1) "exceptional resource value," (2) "ordinary value," and (3) "inter-
mediate resource value" (leftovers), based upon the character and the nature of
the freshwater wetland. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9B-7(a)-(c).
191. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9B-3.
192. The FWPA actually designates its authority to the former Department
of Environmental Protection and Energy. ,See generally N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13.9B-9a, 17a, 21f (West 1994).
193. See id. § 13:9B-25(c).
194. See id. § 13-9B-26.
195. The FWPA requires that the DEP inform the clerk of each municipality
that the maps are not entirely conclusive for purposes of locating the actual
boundary of wetlands. See id.
196. See John Fitzgerald English & John J. Sarno, The Freshwater Wetlands
Protection Act: Give and "Take" in New Jersey, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 249,
254 (1989) (citing W. NIERING, WETLANDS, (1985) (Audobon Society Nature
Guide)).
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for fish and wildlife resources. 197 Thus, the enactment of the
FWPA reveals an unclouded intention on the part of the leg-
islature to preserve the integrity and purity of freshwater
wetlands from "unnecessary or undesirable alteration or
disturbance."198
2. A Statutory History of Wetlands Regulation in New
Jersey
Prior to the passage of the FWPA in 1987, the authority
to regulate the preservation of freshwater wetlands, with the
exception of the Meadowlands and Pinelands,199 was vested
in local authorities pursuant to the Municipal Land Use Law
(MLUL).200 Under the MLUL, each municipality was permit-
ted to adopt a master plan.201 Each plan was based upon sev-
eral elements, including housing, utility service,
transportation, recreation, economic impact, recycling, his-
197. See id. (citing Exec. Order No. 11,990 (May 24, 1977) and accompanying
statement).
198. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9B-2.
199. The legislators of the Act wanted to avoid "duplicative procedures with
respect to freshwater wetlands already regulated." Senate Energy and Environ-
ment Committee Statement to Senate Committee Substitute for Assembly Com-
mittee Substitute for Assembly Nos. 2342 and 2499, 2d Legis. Sess. 16 (N.J.
1996). The Act:
exempts lands located in the pinelands areas as defined in section
10 of the 'Pinelands Protection Act,'; P. L. 1979, c. 111 (C. 13:18A-
11), those lands under the jurisdiction of the Hackensack Meadowl-
ands Development Commission pursuant to P. L. 1968, c. 404 (C.
13:17-1 et seq.), . . . and coastal wetlands regulated pursuant to
'The Wetlands Act of 1970,' P. L. 1970, c. 272 (C. 13:9A-1 et seq.).
This exemption is not absolute, however, because development ac-
tivities in these areas would be required to meet the criteria of the
federal wetlands program as implemented by either the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers or the [D]epartment [of Environmental Protec-
tion] (after assumption of the federal program).
Id. at 14, 16.
200. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:55D-1 to -112 (West 1991).
201. According to section 40:55D-28(a) of the New Jersey Code, "[tihe plan-
ning board may prepare and, after public hearing, adopt or amend a master
plan or component parts thereof, to guide the use of lands within the municipal-
ity in a manner which protects public health and safety and promotes general
welfare." Id. § 40:55D-28(a).
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toric preservation, and conservation. 20 2 The plan was to
include
a conservation plan element providing for the preserva-
tion, conservation, and utilization of natural resources, in-
cluding, to the extent appropriate, energy, open space,
water supply, forests, soil, marshes, wetlands, harbors, riv-
ers and other waters, fisheries, endangered or threatened
species wildlife and other resources, and which systemati-
cally analyzes the impact of each other component and ele-
ment of the master plan on the present and future
preservation, conservation and utilization of those
resources.
203
3. Legislative History of the FWPA
In the years preceding the enactment of the FWPA, both
legislators and environmentalists recognized a need for uni-
form state freshwater wetlands protection regulation in New
Jersey that was more stringent and encompassing than the
federal program under the CWA section 404.204 With increas-
ing efforts to maintain clean waters, protect against flooding,
and preserve the habitat for endangered species, legislators
drafted the FWPA in an attempt to protect the environment
from various types of intrusions. 20 5 The FWPA regulates
more development than is regulated by the federal program,
and unlike the federal program, it regulates development in
transition areas adjacent to freshwater wetlands. 20 6
Prior to the enactment of the FWPA, the undertaking of
regulated activities in freshwater wetlands was a substantial
obstacle to wetlands preservation and protection. Conse-
quently, when the legislators drafted the FWPA, they man-
dated that permits be issued before regulated activities could
202. See id. § 40:55D-28(b).
203. Id. § 40:55D-28(b)(8).
204. Senate Energy and Environment Committee Statement to Senate Com-
mittee Substitute for Assembly Committee Substitute for Assembly Nos. 2342
and 2499, 1st Legis. Sess. 1 (N.J. 1987).
205. See id.
206. See id.
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be lawfully conducted, but only in circumstances where the
applicant could "demonstrate a compelling public need for the
project," and where the proposed project "would be in the
public interest, would result in minimal alteration of the
aquatic ecosystem, and would not jeopardize any threatened
or endangered species, cause a violation of a water quality or
discharge standard, or degrade surface or ground water."20 7
4. The FWPA Generally
In Summer 1987, new wetlands legislation was enacted
in New Jersey.208 The FWPA was passed in response to an
Executive Order by then Governor Thomas Kean, and de-
clared an immediate delay on state processing of permits au-
thorizing development in freshwater wetlands. 20 9 The FWPA
became effective on July 1, 1988,210 and the "transition area"
provision became effective one year later.211 The FWPA was
modeled after a wetlands preservation law in Michigan that
was in effect at the time of enactment of the FWPA.212 At
that time, Michigan was one of the only states allowed by the
federal government to regulate wetlands under the CWA.213
207. Id. at 2.
208. See id. §§ 13:9B-1 to -30. See also N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, §§ 7A-6 to -7
(1996).
209. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit 7, §§ 7A-6 to -7 (citing Exec. Order No. 175
(June 8, 1987)).
210. See Wolf & Goldshore, Navigation Through the Wetlands Act, 120
N.J.L.J. 645 (1987).
211. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9B-1. According to title 7, section 7A-6.1 of the
New Jersey Administrative Code, a transition area serves the following roles:
(1) An ecological transition zone from uplands to freshwater wet-
lands which is an integral portion of the freshwater wetlands
ecosystem, providing temporary refuge for freshwater wetlands
fauna during high water episodes, critical habitat for animals
dependent upon but not resident in freshwater wetlands, and
slight variations of freshwater wetland boundaries over time
due to hydrologic or climatologic effects; and
(2) A sediment and storm water control zone to reduce the impacts
of development upon freshwater wetlands and freshwater wet-
lands species.
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7A-6.1.
212. See MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 281.700 to -722 (repealed 1994).
213. See Public Bill Signing: Wetlands Bill Signing, Sponsor Statement, As-
sembly Bills 2342, 2499, State of New Jersey (July 1, 1987).
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The FWPA mandates strict regulation of activities in
freshwater wetlands and establishes complex requirements
for obtaining permits to develop in and around wetlands. 214
The FWPA's drafters provided for the state takeover of the
Federal 404 program 215 within one year of the FWPA's enact-
ment.21 6 Moreover, a large number of activities that are con-
sidered destructive of wetlands are regulated pursuant to the
Act's permit program. 21 7 As of 1987, the year that the FWPA
214. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9B-1 to -30.
215. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994). New Jersey and Michigan are the only
states to have been delegated Clean Water Act Section 404 permitting author-
ity. New Jersey's 404 Program assumption took effect on March 2, 1994. See 59
Fed. Reg. 9933 (1994). Michigan's 404 Program assumption took effect on Octo-
ber 16, 1984. See Fed. Reg. 38,947 (1984).
216. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9B-27 (West 1994). According to the provisions
of the Act, New Jersey assumes wetlands permit jurisdiction, which was previ-
ously exercised by the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the EPA,
under the 404 program (section 404 of the Clean Water Act). See id. § 13:9B-2.
Under the current federal 404 program, the Army Corps of Engineers regulates
only the filling in of freshwater wetlands. The state program administered by
the state DEP "will cover every activity in the wetlands, from moving sand to
dredging soil. Public Bill Signing: Wetlands Bill Signing, Sponsor Statement,
Assembly Bills 2342, 2499, State of New Jersey (July 1, 1987). See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1344. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9B-17a which states:
The following activities, except for normal property maintenance or
minor and temporary disturbances of the transition area resulting
from, and necessary for, normal construction activities on land ad-
jacent to the transition area, are prohibited in the transition area,
except in accordance with a transition waiver approved by the de-
partment pursuant to section 18 of this act:
(1) Removal, excavation, or disturbance of the soil;
(2) Dumping or filling with any materials;
(3) Erection of any structures, except for temporary structures of
150 square feet or less;
(4) Placement of pavements;
(5) Destruction of plant life which would alter the existing pattern
of vegetation.
Id.
217. Title 7, section 7A-2.3, of the New Jersey Administrative Code lists
those activities that are regulated under the Act. These activities include:
(1) The removal, excavation, disturbance or dredging of soil, sand,
gravel, or aggregate material of any kind;
(2) The drainage or disturbance of the water level or water table;
(3) The dumping, discharging or filling with any materials;
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became effective, the wetlands rules affected approximately
300,000 acres of freshwater wetlands in New Jersey, consti-
tuting about six percent of the state's land mass.218
Despite the existence of the MLUL, the FWPA contains a
preemption clause stating that "no municipality, county, or
political subdivision thereof, shall enact, subsequent to [July
1, 1988], any law, ordinance, or rules or regulations regulat-
ing freshwater wetlands, and further, this act shall supersede
any law or ordinance regulating freshwater wetlands enacted
prior to [July 1, 1988]."219 Thus, the FWPA supersedes all
local laws passed pursuant to the Municipal Land Use Law
that regulate the use of freshwater wetlands in any way.220
However, the regulations "shall not preempt pre-existing
State regulatory programs which affect regulated activities in
freshwater wetlands."221 The legislature, in adopting the
FWPA, balanced its interests in protecting wetlands with the
rights of a real property owner affected by the new
program. 222
Robertson dealt with three provisions of the FWPA.
First, section 9a requires that "[a] person proposing to engage
in a regulated activity shall apply to the department for a
freshwater wetlands permit."223 Second, section 17a lists the
activities that are prohibited in transition areas. 224 Third,
section 21f describes the culpability requirements of viola-
tions of the FWPA and the penalties that can be imposed. It
states that "[a] person who willfully or negligently violates
(4) The driving of pilings;
(5) The placing of obstructions; or
(6) The destruction of plant life which would alter the character of
a freshwater wetland, including the cutting of trees except the
approved harvesting of forest products pursuant to N.J.A.C.
7:7A-2.7(b).
N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 7A-2.3 (1996).
218. See Public Bill Signing: Wetlands Bill Signing, Sponsor Statement, As-
sembly Bills 2342, 2499, 1st Legis. Sess. 1 (July 1, 1987).
219. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9B-30 (West 1991).
220. See N.J. ADMn. CODE tit. 7, § 7A-1.6(b) (1996).
221. Id. § 7A-1.6(d).
222. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9B-30.
223. Id. § 13:9B-9a.
224. See id. § 13:9B-17a (West 1994). See supra note 201.
35
690 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15
this act shall be guilty, upon conviction, of a crime of the
fourth degree and shall be subject to a fine of not less than
$2,500.00 nor more than $25,000.00 per day of violation."225
It is unclear how the phrase "willfully or negligently" should
be defined, and to which elements it should extend.
E. Application of New Jersey's Gap Filler Provision-
State v. Sewell226
The court in Robertson did not consider whether the
criminal provisions of the FWPA could be adequately deemed
a public welfare offense, but instead, relied on the New
Jersey Supreme Court's holding in Sewell to interpret the
mens rea requirements in the criminal provisions of the
FWPA. In Sewell, the defendants were charged with the rob-
bery of a woman at an Atlantic City casino. 227 The issue in
Sewell was the degree of culpability that a defendant must
possess when he "inflicts injury or uses force against another
in the course of a theft in order to escalate theft into rob-
bery."228 The statute did not indicate the mental state that
must be shown with respect to the injury/force element of rob-
bery.229 The court determined that the legislature did not in-
225. Id. § 13:9B-21f.
226. 603 A.2d 21 (N.J. 1992).
227. See id.
228. Id. at 23.
229. See id. Section 2C:15-1a of the New Jersey Code, the robbery provision,
states that "[a] person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft,
he: (1) [i]nflicts bodily injury or uses force upon another...." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:15-1a (West 1991). When a statute does not specify the culpability stan-
dard the New Jersey Code provides a method for determining the relevant
mental state. "[T]he absence of any express culpability requirement [in a crimi-
nal statute] brings into play the gap filler provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2c(3)." See
State v. Demarest, 599 A.2d 937 (N.J. Super App. Div. 1992) (endangering the
welfare of a child); State v. Brown, 571 A.2d 1367 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div.
1990) (escape); State v. A.J. Emers, Inc., 532 A.2d 1124 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987) (failure to remit unemployment insurance contributions to evade tax
payments); State v. Merlino, 505 A.2d 157 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1985) (brib-
ery); State In Interest of C.P. & R.D. 341 A.2d 850 (N.J. Ch. 1986) (aggravated
sexual assault). Section 2C:2-2c(3) of the New Jersey Code, the gap filler provi-
sion provides:
Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a stat-
ute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless
be required for the commission of such offense, or with respect to
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dicate an intent to impose strict liability to the injury/force
element of robbery, 230 but rather, the defendant must have
"knowingly" inflicted injury or used force against another
while committing a theft in order for it to qualify as a
robbery. 231
III. State of New Jersey v. Robertson
A. Facts
The defendant, David Robertson, was a farmer who
raised chickens and livestock. 232 In order to level his land to
make it suitable for grazing, the defendant arranged to have
more than one hundred tons of wood chips delivered to his
property, in an area that was slightly more than one acre of
his property.233 After local authorities complained about the
amount of wood chips being dumped on the defendant's prop-
erty, a detective from the prosecutor's office, along with the
municipal zoning officer, representatives from the Depart-
some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed con-
duct necessarily involves such culpable mental state. A statute de-
fining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to
impose strict liability, should be construed as defining a crime with
the culpability defined in paragraph b.(2) of this section.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2c(3) (West 1991). This gap filler provision specifically
directs that unless there is a specific intention on the part of the legislature to
apply strict criminal liability to the commission of a crime, it should not be
done. See id.
230. See Sewell, 603 A.2d at 24.
231. See id. "Where the intent to impose strict liability is not clearly indi-
cated, a specific culpable mental state must be ascribed to the crime or its mate-
rial elements 'if no culpable mental state is expressly designated in [the] statute
defining [the] offense.'" Id. at 23. See also State v. Michalek, 504 A.2d 155 (N.J.
Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1985). That mental state is "knowingly." See State v. Rovito,
494 A.2d 309 (1985). See id. at 23-24. "Where the intent to impose strict liabil-
ity is not clearly indicated, a specific culpable mental state must be ascribed to
the crime or its material elements 'if no culpable mental state is expressly des-
ignated in [the] statute defining [the] offense.'" N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2c(3)
(West 1991). That mental state is "knowingly." See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:2-
2b(2) (West 1991). See Rovito, 494 A.2d 309 (1985) (requiring that when an
offense has no "specified requirement of culpability," "knowingly" is the stan-
dard of culpability that is applied according to the gap-filler provision of the
New Jersey Code).
232. See Robertson, 670 A.2d at 1097.
233. See id.
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ment of Environmental Protection (DEP), and the county
health inspector inspected the site with the defendant.
23 4
The defendant, in a discussion with the detective, revealed
little knowledge of freshwater wetlands, and admitted that
he was never given permission to fill the property in ques-
tion.235 One of the DEP investigators inspected the site four
times and performed a number of tests. 236 Of the tests that
were performed, the "three-parameter approach"237 revealed
characteristic vegetation and soil types indicative of wet-
lands. 238 As a result of his observations and experiences with
freshwater wetlands, the investigator deduced that the area
was a wetland, and that "placing wood chips [on this prop-
erty] constituted a regulated activity requiring a permit from
the DEP."239
The defendant offered a soil survey map that he had re-
ceived some years before he began to introduce the wood
chips onto his property. 240 The map indicated some soil types
indicative of a wetland, and the defendant subsequently iden-
tified his property on the map. 241 He acknowledged that he
had neither a freshwater wetlands permit nor a transition
area waiver from the DEP.242 Robertson sought to challenge
the testing methods and to assert that he was exempt from
regulation because he was engaged in an exempted farming
activity-the use of wood chips to create pasture. 243
B. Jury Instructions
At trial, the judge was uncertain how to define "willfully
or negligently," the mens rea requirement in the statute.
244
As a result, he decided not to instruct the jury on negligent
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
238. See Robertson, 670 A.2d at 1097-98.
239. Id. at 1098.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See id.
244. See id.
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conduct, but rather determined that he would hold the State
to a higher burden of proof.245 Accordingly, the judge defined
"willfully" as "purposely."246 The judge subsequently ex-
plained to the jury that it had to decide whether the State
proved that the area at issue was, in fact, a freshwater wet-
lands or transition area, and if so, whether the defendant en-
gaged in a regulated activity "with a purposeful state of
mind."247 Lastly, the jury had to decide whether the defend-
ant's conduct was exempt from requiring a permit as normal
farming.248 The judge instructed the jury that the State did
not have the burden of proving the defendant had knowledge
that the property in question was wetlands.249 The jury
asked the judge to explain his response and the "judge re-
stated the elements of the crime and emphasized that the ele-
ments did not include a requirement that the State was
required to prove defendant knew the area [was a wet-
land]."250 The defense objected to this instruction on the
ground that these responses effectively directed a guilty ver-
dict against the defendant. 251
245. See id.
246. Id. The judge instructed the jury that
a person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct or
the result thereof if it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of
that nature or to cause such a result. A person acts purposely with
respect to the attendant circumstances if he is aware of the exist-
ence of those circumstances or believes or hopes that they exist.
The phrases with purpose, design or with design or the equivalent
terms have all the same meaning.
Id. at 1098.
247. Id.
248. See id. According to N.J. STAT. ANN. 13:9B-4, normal farming "[is] ex-
empt from the requirement of a freshwater wetlands permit and transition area
requirements unless the United States Environmental Protection Agency's reg-
ulations providing for the delegation to the state of the federal wetlands pro-
gram conducted pursuant to the federal Act require a permit...." N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 13:9B-4 (West 1991).
249. See Robertson, 670 A.2d at 1099.
250. Id.
251. See Id.
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C. Holding of the Superior Court
In the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mon-
mouth County, Robertson was found guilty of performing an
unlawful regulated activity in a freshwater wetlands or
transition area by willfully or negligently engaging in a
regulated activity within a freshwater wetlands or transi-
tion area without a freshwater wetlands permit or a transi-
tion area permit issued by the Department of
Environmental Protection, contrary to the provisions of
N.J.S.A. 13:9B-9a, N.J.S.A. 13:9B-17a and N.J.S.A. 13:9B-
21f. 2 52
He was convicted and sentenced to two years of probation and
fined $5,000.253 The defendant appealed to the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.254 The Appellate
Division held that all of the defendant's arguments were
without merit, with the exception of the defendant's chal-
lenge to the jury charge. 255
D. Defendant's Arguments
During the course of the proceedings, the defendant
made a number of arguments. The trial court realized that
252. Id. at 1097.
253. See Id.
254. See id. at 1098. The following issues were raised on appeal:
(1) The Grand Jury was not properly instructed as to the law
before handing up the indictment.
(2) The most important element of proof necessary for conviction
was not presented to the Grand Jury or at trial.
(3) The statute is unconstitutional with respect to criminal
convictions.
(4) The County Prosecutor lacked the authority to indict or
prosecute.
(5) The indictment is defective.
(6) The defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel.
(7) The jury charge was erroneous.
(8) The State misled the juries.
Id.
255. See id.
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there would be problems with incorporating the word "negli-
gently" as was stated in the statute, so the court omitted the
term when it read its indictment to the jury.256 The defend-
ant argued that the court should have either left the word in
and allowed the jury to decide its meaning, or attempted to
explain its meaning in a criminal context. 257 The defendant
also claimed that the court incorrectly stated the law by mak-
ing no mention of any possible exemptions, such as the Na-
tionwide Permit 258 or the Right to Farm Act.259 Defendant
asserted that this resulted in great confusion during jury de-
liberations. 260 Further, the defendant suggested that the in-
vestigator from the DEP had to have been aware of these
exemptions and he must have told the prosecutor.261 Thus,
there was no legitimate reason for the court not to have been
informed of these exemptions. 262 The defense counsel was
concerned that the judge's charge to the jury would have the
effect of directing a verdict against the defendant. 263 More-
over, the jury equated freshwater wetlands permit require-
ments with building permit requirements, which appellant
claimed was incorrect. 264 In effect, the judge conferred to the
jury the idea that it did not matter whether the defendant
knew whether the lands were wetlands or not.265
256. See Brief of Appellee at 13, State of New Jersey v. Robertson, 670 A.2d
1096 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (No. 91-09-1397).
257. See id. at 13-14.
258. See id. at 14. The Nationwide Permit exemption is set forth in tit. 7,
§ 7A-2.9(B)(6)(1), and issued pursuant to § 7A-2.7(f) of the New Jersey Admin-
istrative Code. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, §§ 7A-2.9(b)(6)(1), 7A-2.7(f) (1996).
259. See Brief of Appellee at 13-14, Robertson (No. 91-09-1397). The Right to
Farm Act is found at section 4:1C-1 to 55 of the New Jersey Code and section
13:9B-4 of the New Jersey Code exempts various activities from the permit re-
quirements of the Act. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:1C-1 to -55 (West 1991).
260. See id.
261. See Brief of Appellee at 14, Robertson (No. 91-09-1397).
262. See id. at 14.
263. See id. at 16.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 17.
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E. State's Arguments
In response to the arguments raised by the defendant,
the State defended the holding of the trial court. The State
conceded that the trial court erred in its instructions to the
jury, but that the error worked to the advantage of the de-
fendant, as it had the effect of heightening the State's burden
beyond the requirements of the law. 266 The State also
claimed that since the defendant did not initially challenge
the jury charges on the grounds complained of, the challenges
were waived. 267 Additionally, the State asserted that should
the court reach the merits of the defendant's claim, the de-
fendant would have to prove that the alleged error led the
jury to reach a verdict that it otherwise would not have
reached in order to get a reversal on this ground.268
In response to the defendant's claim of exemption based
on the Nationwide Permit and Right to Farm Act, the State
contended that these claims had already been addressed and
there was no reason to revisit their merits. 269
Moreover, the State asserted that it was the defendant's
responsibility to determine whether the area in question con-
stituted a freshwater wetlands or transition area before en-
gaging in regulated activity. 270 The State added that the
FWPA actually provided a device in order to make such a
determination.2 7 1
266. See Brief of Appellant at 38, State of New Jersey v. Robertson, 670 A.2d
1096 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (No. 91-09-1397).
267. See id. (citing N.J. CT. R. 1:7-2 (West 1992)).
268. See id. (citing N.J. CT. R. 2:10-2).
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. See id. at 39 (N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:9B-8a, 8i (West 1991)). Section
13:9B-8a of the Act provides:
A person proposing to engage in a regulated activity in a freshwater
wetland or in an activity which requires a transition area waiver
may, prior to applying for a freshwater wetlands permit or transi-
tion area waiver, request from the department a letter of interpre-
tation to establish that the site of the proposed activity is located in
a freshwater wetland or transition area.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9B-8a. Section 13:9B-8i of the Act provides:
Any person who requests a letter of interpretation pursuant to the
provisions of this act and does not receive a response from the de-
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The State added that "only instructional error occurred
when the court eliminated that portion of N.J.S.A. 13:9B-
21(f), which provides for criminal liability under the Wet-
lands Act, even if a person 'negligently' violates its man-
date."272 The FWPA contains the culpability requirement of
"willfully" which is not among the options in N.J.S.A. 2C:2-
2.273 Thus, the court construed "willfully" to be synonymous
with "purposely" as provided by N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1).274 The
State opposed the court's assertion that the FWPA's similar
treatment of violations that are willful and negligent "doesn't
make any sense."275 The court consequently explained that it
was not going to instruct the jury of its responsibility to find
the defendant guilty even if it determined that he acted negli-
gently.27 6 The State admitted that the court's attempt to "ju-
dicially reconstruct" the FWPA in this way was "badly
misguided," as it is the job of the legislature to define crimes
in an appropriate manner, subject only to constitutional
limitations.277
The State contended that the legislative history of the
FWPA confirmed the legislature's intention to treat willful
and negligent violators of the FWPA similarly, by exposing
them to less severe punishment.278 The Senate Committee
Statement attached to the Senate Committee Substitute
dated June 25, 1987, eventually signed into law as public law
1977, chapter 74,279 stated that "[t]his bill also provides pen-
partment within the deadlines imposed in this section shall not be
entitled to assume that the site of the proposed activity which was
the subject of the request for a letter of interpretation is not in a
freshwater wetland. A person who receives a letter of interpreta-
tion pursuant to this section shall be entitled to rely on the determi-
nation of the department ....
Id. § 13:9B-8i (West 1996).
272. Brief of Appellant at 41-42, Robertson (No. 91-09-1397).
273. Id. at 42.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See id. at 42 (citing Record at 3/8, 10-4 to -10).
277. Id.
278. See id. at 43.
279. Senate Committee Substitute for Assembly Committee Substitute for As-
sembly Nos. 2342 and 2499, 1st Legis. Sess. 6 (N.J. 1987) (citing Pub. L. No.
1977, ch. 74 (June 25, 1987)).
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alties for violations of the 'Water Pollution Control Act.'"'280
The significance of this is that the criminal provisions of the
Water Pollution Control Act do not treat similarly those who
violate its provisions willfully and those who violate its provi-
sions negligently. 28 l  "Instead, it provides more stringent
penalties for purposeful, knowing or reckless violations,
N.J.S.A. 58:10A-10(f)(1)(a) and 58:10A-10(f)(2) (designated as
second or third degree crimes) than it does for negligent vio-
lations, N.J.S.A. 58:10A-10(f)(3) (a fourth degree crime)."2 2
The State alleged that what this effectively demonstrated is
that the legislators of the FWPA purposely grouped the same
classes of offenders it had seen proper to treat differently in
280. Id.
281. See Brief of Appellant at 43, Robertson (No. 91-09-1397).
282. Id. Section 58:10A-10(f)(1)(a) of the New Jersey Code provides:
[Any person who purposely, knowingly or recklessly violates this
act, and the violation causes a significant adverse environmental
effect, shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a crime of the second de-
gree, and shall... be subject to a fine of not less than $25,000 nor
more than $250,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment or by
both.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-10(f)(1)(a) (West 1991). Section 58:10A-10(f)(1)(b) of
the New Jersey Code provides:
[Any person who purposely, knowingly or recklessly violates this
act, including making a false statement, representation, or certifi-
cation in any application, record, or other document filed or re-
quired to be maintained under this act, or by falsifying, tampering
with, or rendering inaccurate any monitoring device or method re-
quired to be maintained pursuant to this act, or by failing to submit
a monitoring report, or any portion thereof, required pursuant to
this act, shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a crime of the third de-
gree, and shall ... be subject to a fine of not less than $5,000 nor
more than $75,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment, or by
both.
Id. § 58:10A-10(f)(2). Section 58:10A-10(f)(3) provides:
Any person who negligently violates this act, including making a
false statement, representation, or certification in any application,
record, or other document filed or required to be maintained under
this act, or by falsifying, tampering with, or rendering inaccurate
any monitoring device or method required to be maintained pursu-
ant to this act, shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a crime of the
fourth degree, and shall . . .be subject to a fine of not less than
$5,000 nor more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprison-
ment, or by both.
Id. § 58:10A-10(f)(3).
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the source statute, subjecting all to the more lenient punish-
ment for a fourth degree offense. 28 3
F. Appellate Division's Opinion
1. Holding
On appeal, the Superior Court, Appellate Division, tak-
ing into account the decision of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey in Sewell, held that the State could not rest on strict
liability.2 4 In a criminal prosecution brought under N.J.S.A.
13:9B-21(f), 28 5 the State must prove that the defendant had
knowledge or should have had knowledge that the area in
question was subject to the FWPA, and the jury should have
been instructed to decide whether the State proved that the
defendant was culpable in neglecting to determine whether a
permit or waiver was required. 28 6
2. Reasoning
The evidence revealed that the defendant, by examining
the soil logs on the local maps, did inquire into the status of
the property as freshwater wetlands. 28 7 The jury should
have been informed that it was required to decide whether
the State proved that the defendant was culpable in failing to
determine whether he needed a permit or waiver.288 Instead,
the judge took this issue from the jury by explaining that the
State was not required to prove that the defendant knew that
the area was a wetlands or a transition area.28 9 As a result,
the defendant was held strictly liable, which effectively di-
rected the verdict against the defendant. 290 Subsequently,
the Appellate Division reversed and remanded the case for a
283. See Brief of Appellant at 43.
284. See Robertson, 670 A.2d 1096, 1099 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1996).
285. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
286. See Robertson, 670 A.2d at 1099.
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id.
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new trial or for other action that the prosecutor or commis-
sioner deemed necessary. 291
IV. Analysis
A. Criminal Provisions of the FWPA as a Public
Welfare Offense
In arriving at its decision, the Robertson court did not
consider whether the criminal provisions of the FWPA could
appropriately have been considered a public welfare offense.
Instead, the court relied on the decision in Sewell, which held
that the knowledge of the defendant applied to each of the
elements of a robbery statute which was void of any mental
state element, because "[c]ourts have generally ascribed the
culpable mental state of 'knowingly' with respect to crimes
that do not otherwise designate a culpable mental state."292
If Robertson had incorporated a public welfare doctrine
analysis, like the four of the five circuits that have inter-
preted the criminal provisions of the CWA, the State would
not have been required to prove the defendant's knowledge of
the relevant provisions of the FWPA. Yet, because public
welfare offenses do not fit into any neat categories, the ele-
ments of public welfare offenses must be examined in order to
determine if criminal provisions of the FWPA could be appro-
priately deemed public welfare offenses.
First, one of the most common elements of a public wel-
fare offense is the protection of the public health and safety.
Some of the goals of the FWPA are to maintain clean waters,
protect against flooding, and preserve the habitat for plants
and animals. These objectives certainly affect the public's
well being in its entirety and the classification of the criminal
provisions of the FWPA as a public welfare offense would aid
in furthering these objectives.
Second, the nature of the action is often considered an
aspect of a public welfare offense, as certain acts are so dan-
gerous or risky that the actor should be held responsible re-
291. See id.
292. Sewell, 603 A.2d at 25.
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gardless of his or her mental state. By considering activities
that have been placed into this category, such as the posses-
sion of hand grenades in Freed, unregistered machine guns in
Staples, and possession and shipping of obnoxious waste
materials in International Minerals, provisions of the FWPA
do not appear to be of a similar nature. The "nature" of the
provisions of the FWPA themselves probably do not justify
the implementation of the public welfare doctrine, as they
would not place a reasonable person on notice of the substan-
tial regulation of freshwater wetlands.
Third, many, though not all, statutes that have been con-
sidered in light of the public welfare doctrine lack a mens rea
requirement. The criminal provisions of the FWPA at issue
in Robertson did contain a mens rea requirement, but it was
unclear to which elements of the statute it applied. In Rat-
zlaf, like in Robertson, the court held that in order to prove
that the defendant had "willfully" violated the applicable
statute, the government must prove that the defendant pos-
sessed knowledge of the illegality of his or her conduct.
Finally, a common element of public welfare offenses is
the imposition of light fines and penalties in which the de-
fendant suffers little harm to his or her reputation. It is un-
clear whether criminal provisions of the FWPA, violations of
which are fourth degree crimes, would fit into this cate-
gory.293 However, because penalties for FWPA violations do
not possess the same seriousness as many felonies that are
considered public welfare offenses, they may be considered
"light." As noted by the Supreme Court in Staples, courts are
not very quick to classify statutes that impose substantial
penalties as public welfare offenses.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Wilson, a case brought
under criminal provisions of the CWA and involving the fill-
ing of freshwater wetlands, is probably the most compelling
authority for deeming criminal provisions of the FWPA public
welfare offenses. Wilson represents the first time that a cir-
cuit court of appeals applied the public welfare doctrine to the
293. See supra note 225 and accompanying text for the penalties that are
imposed under the criminal provisions of the FWPA.
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filling of freshwater wetlands. This court indicated that
although the illegal filling of wetlands may not be as deleteri-
ous or destructive as other statutes that have been identified
as public welfare offenses, its effects stand in the way of Con-
gress' objective to protect the public health.
B. Express Words and Legislative History of the FWPA,
General Principles of Mens Rea, and
Relevant Decisions
1. Express Words of the FWPA's Criminal Provisions
and Legislative History
As an analysis of the express words of the FWPA proves
unhelpful in determining the requisite mens rea and how it
should be applied, it is necessary to turn to legislative his-
tory. According to the legislative history of the FWPA, the
legislators intended for the FWPA to be liberally construed,
and noted that "[t]he object, design, and purpose of this act
[is] the protection of the freshwater wetlands resources of the
State. ' 294 Thus, although "knowledge" is not explicitly men-
tioned in section 21f of the FWPA, the Robertson court
broadly interpreted the phrase "willfully or negligently" to re-
quire that the defendant have knowledge of all of the ele-
ments of the statute, to ensure proper maintenance and
continued preservation of the state's freshwater wetlands
and encourage economic growth.
Moreover, by providing penalties for violations of crimi-
nal provisions of the FWPA comparable to the penalties for
violations of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the
FWPA's legislators intended to assign harsher penalties to
those who knowingly violated the statute. This is demon-
strated by the separate grouping of different classes of offend-
ers. But the grouping of both willful and negligent offenders
into one class in the provisions of the FWPA indicated that
the legislators intended to punish all willful and negligent vi-
olations as fourth degree crimes.
294. Senate Energy and Environment Committee Statement to Senate Com-
mittee Substitute for Assembly Committee Substitute for Assembly Nos. 2342
and 2499, 1st Legis. Sess. 16 (N.J. 1987).
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2. General Principles of Mens Rea
a. General Intent Versus Specific Intent
Interestingly, the court in Robertson strayed from the typi-
cal general intent imposition by requiring that the defendant
possess knowledge that he was performing acts strictly pro-
hibited by the FWPA. However, it is not completely uncom-
mon to have a specific intent requirement for the type of
statute that was involved in Liparota and Morissette for ex-
ample, and generally for those statutes that would not fall
under the ambit of the public welfare doctrine. This specific
intent designation is also consistent with the general princi-
ple that actors are presumed to be aware of statutes that reg-
ulate dangerous conduct or deleterious devices. This could be
indicative of the Robertson court's unwillingness to designate
the FWPA as a public welfare statute. However, the defend-
ant's acts in Robertson would not be considered of the type
that a reasonable person should know are strictly regulated.
The Wilson court, in interpreting provisions of the CWA,
noted that the filling of freshwater wetlands could trigger the
public welfare doctrine. In the interests of fairness, it would
be improper to subject the defendant to stringent penalties
for performing acts, unaware of their regulation and poten-
tial consequences.
b. Mistake of Law and Mistake of Fact
By examining general principles of mens rea and crimi-
nal law, commentators, and even some courts, have recog-
nized that the argument that ignorance of the law is no
defense has been overstated. 295 This argument, however,
does continue to hold true in two areas of cases-those in
which a defendant contends that he was ignorant of the law
with which he has been charged, 296 and those in which the
295. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.04 commentary at 274-275 (1985); Ron-
ald A. Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 1269, 1295-1299 (1974); Liparota, 471 U.S. 419, 420 (1985); Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225, 225 (1957); United States v. Simpson, 561 F.2d 53, 61-
62 (7th Cir. 1977).
296. See, e.g., Morgan v. District of Columbia, 476 A.2d 1128, 1133 (D.C.
App. 1984); United States v. Currier, 621 F.2d 7, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1980).
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defendant knows the law exists and concludes reasonably
and in good faith that it does not apply to him, but is incor-
rect in his assumption. 297
The defendant in Robertson alleged ignorance of the
existence of the pertinent provisions of the FWPA. However,
evidence showed that either he was aware that his acts were
regulated or he should have known. By holding that proof of
the defendant's knowledge of the statute was a prerequisite
to conviction, the court's decision in Robertson runs counter
to the widely, although not completely, accepted principle
that ignorance of the law is not a defense to its violation. 298
c. Rule of Lenity
Another principle of criminal law, the rule of lenity, has
been offered as an exception to the traditional application of
mens rea in certain contexts. However, the Supreme Court,
in cases such as Liparota, International Minerals, and
Staples, has hinted that in the area of public welfare offenses,
the rule of lenity may not be entirely appropriate. The hold-
ing in Robertson is generally consistent with these fundamen-
tal principles. By applying the requisite mens rea to each
element of the statute, consistent with the principle set forth
in Sewell, the Robertson court ensured that the defendant, in
light of the confusion surrounding the mens rea requirement
of the FWPA, would be treated in a most favorable manner.
V. Conclusion
The court in Robertson, held that the State must prove
the defendant was aware of the illegality of his conduct and
that the area in question was freshwater wetlands, in order
for him to be found guilty of violating the FWPA. The deci-
sion in Robertson, although consistent with the general prin-
ciple that a mens rea term is to be applied to each element of
the offense, was inconsistent with a majority of the decisions
297. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 101, at
288-289 (2d ed. 1961).
298. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991); Barlow v. United
States, 32 U.S. 404, 411 (7 Pet. 1833).
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that applied the public welfare doctrine to criminal provi-
sions in various environmental statutes.
Although not considered by the Robertson court, the im-
position of the public welfare doctrine would have been an
effective way to accomplish the legislators' goal of protecting
and preserving New Jersey's freshwater wetlands. The fact
that Robertson could have been examined under the public
welfare doctrine, and because courts have been considering
environmental statutes in this regard, New Jersey courts
may decide to move in the direction of applying this doctrine
to the criminal provisions of the FWPA. By applying the pub-
lic welfare doctrine to the FWPA and other environmental
statutes, persons who fill freshwater wetlands, transport or
store hazardous chemicals, or emit pollutants into the water
or the air, would be penalized for failing to follow the proper
legal procedures, procedures which they know or should
know exist. These individuals would be unable to escape lia-
bility by simply claiming that they were not aware of the ille-
gality of what they were doing, either because they failed to
find out about or ignored the industry regulations, or because
they did not go through the proper channels to conduct their
activity legally.
Cases such as Weitzenhoff, Hopkins, Frezzo Bros., and
Wilson illustrate that courts are willing to examine federal
water pollution control regulations in light of the public wel-
fare doctrine. Yet, critics of applying the public welfare doc-
trine to federal water pollution control regulations and
similar environmental statutes note that such application
could make "felons of a large number of innocent people doing
socially valuable work."299
Courts will likely continue to recognize the public wel-
fare doctrine in environmental statutes, but this still remains
to be seen. The direction in which courts ultimately decide to
move will likely represent a compromise between the govern-
ment's responsibility to preserve the environment and to en-
299. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1293 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kienfeld, J.,
dissenting).
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courage economic growth, and an individual's desire to live in
and contribute to a safe and productive environment.
The Supreme Court in Morissette noted that "En]either
this Court nor, so far as we are aware, any other has under-
taken to delineate a precise line or set forth comprehensive
criteria for distinguishing between crimes that require a
mental element and crimes that do not.. . [as it exists at this
time] the law on the subject is neither settled nor static."300
The law remains unsettled today, and Robertson, although it
does not delineate any standards to determine when to apply
a mens rea requirement to criminal provisions of environ-
mental statutes, it does help to clarify how courts may prose-
cute under the FWPA in years to come.
300. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 260 (1952).
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